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THE RELEVANCE OF MORAL DISAGREEMENT. 
SOME WORRIES ABOUT NONDESCRIPTIVIST COGNITIVISM 
Summary 
Josep E. CORBf 
University of Valencia, Spain 
Nondescriptivist Cognitivism vindicates the cognitive value of moral 
judgements despite their lack of descriptive content. In this paper, I raise a 
few worries about the proclaimed virtues of this new metaethical frame-
work Firstly, I argue that Nondescriptivist Cognitivism tends to beg the 
question against descriptivism and, secondly, discuss Horgan and 
Timmons' case against Michael Smith's metaethical rationalism. Al-
though I sympathise with their main critical claims against the latter, I am 
less enthusiastic about the arguments that they provide to support them. 
Terence Horgan and Mark Timmons have recently elaborated a new 
collaborative paper entitled 'Nondescliptivist Cognitivism. Frame-
work for a New Metaethics', where they vindicate the cognitive value 
of moral judgements despite their lack of descriptive content. In some 
of their preceding collaborative papers, Horgan and Timmons had al-
ready developed a number of arguments to challenge a few current at-
tempts to buttress descliptivism and the corresponding metaphysical 
stance, namely: moral realism. They have mainly challenged Brink's 
and Boyd's attempt to treat moral terms as functional, that is, as terms 
that designate functional properties. Although, in 'Troubles for Mi-
chael Smith's Metaethical Rationalism', they also object to Michael 
Smith's interpretation of the claim that normative reasons require the 
convergence "in the desires of fully rational agents." 1 
1. Smith (1994), p. 173. 
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Their line of attack focuses in both cases on the connection be-
tween descriptive content and convergence. They assume that de-
scriptive content is somewhat associated with the possibility of 
achieving a certain sort of convergence as to the correctness of 
judgements. They argue, however, that such kind of convergence is 
not at all available in the case of moral discourse. And this comes up 
as a serious reason to reject moral descriptivism. The novelty in their 
approach lies precisely in the fact that they want to resist the tempta-
tion to think that the dismissal of descriptivism entails that moral 
judgements are deprived of any assertoric force, of all cognitive sig-
nificance. On the contrary, they would like to somewhat honour the 
intuition that moral judgements have assertoric force, that they are 
truth-apt. To do so, they distinguish between cognitive and descrip-
tive content. And this is why they can contend that moral judge-
ments have cognitive content, are cognitively assessable, even if 
moral discourse does not qualify as descriptive. 'Nondescriptivist 
Cognitivism' is unsurprisingly the name reserved for that kind of ap-
proach. 
In what follows, I intend to raise. a few worries about the pro-
claimed virtues of this new metaethical framework as well as chal-
lenge one of Horgan and Timmons' main anti-realist arguments. 
More specifically, in section 1, I will indicate the fundamental fea-
tures of Nondescriptivist Cognitivism and argue that, contrary to 
what Horgan and Timmons' suggest, this framework tends to beg the 
question against descriptivism and, in any event, does not help the 
descriptivist to address the internalist issue. In sections 2 and 3, I 
will explore one of Horgan and Timmons line of reasoning against 
moral realism. In particular, I will discuss their case against Michael 
Smith's metaethical rationalism. Thus, I will firstly dispute most of 
Horgan and Timmons' arguments against Smith's proposals, while, 
at a second stage, I will sketch an alternative line of objection that 
will support most of their critical claims. I will finally suggest that, 
despite the fact that moral judgements cannot obtain the kind of con-
vergence that Horgan and Timmons ascribe to descriptive discourse, 
this may not be a reason to abandon moral descriptivism. For that 
convergence demand may not even be satisfied by judgements that 
are paradigmatically descriptive, like judgements about the shape of 
objects. 
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1. Descriptivism and the New Metaethical Framework 
1.1 Part of the novelty in Horgan and Timmons' metaethical frame-
work derives from their attempt to distinguish three kinds of content, 
namely: declarative, cognitive, and descriptive content. As they say 
Declarative content ... is possessed simply as a result of a grammatical 
form. Typical moral judgments are expressible by declarative sen-
tences ... Cognitive content is belief-eligible and assertible content ... 
Descriptive content is content that purports to represent the world as 
being in a certain way ... Cognitive content has been assumed, by all 
parties in these discussions, to be the same thing as descriptive con-
tent.2 
Traditional metaethical approaches tend to conflate cognitive and 
descriptive content. For they assume that a content is belief-eligible 
if and only if it represents the world as being in a certain way. No 
conceptual room seems then to be left for a judgement to be cogni-
tive without thereby being descriptive and, consequently, the dis-
missal of descriptivism appears to lead quite straightforwardly to the 
rejection of cognitivism. 
Horgan and Timmons seek to block this transition by pulling 
apart cognitive and descriptive content. To do so, they resort to 
Crispin Wright's minimal notion of truth or truth-aptness, and the 
associated distinction between superficial and deep features of a dis-
course. Truth-aptness comes up, in this sense, as a superficial fea-
ture, since its possession by a discourse exclusively depends on the 
existence of a disciplined practice of assessment together with its 
submission to the logical trappings of assertion. 3 No deeper question 
needs to be raised in order to classify a certain discourse as truth-apt 
in this minimal sense. That is why the minimal notion of truth cannot 
by itself settle the deeper issue raised by realists and anti-realists. It 
is not easy to express, however, what the precise content of the real-
2. Horgan and Timmons (2000), p. 2. 
3. As Wright points out: " ... Assertoric discourses are demarcated not by 
any deep feature of their contents which might be simulated or masked by sur-
face syntactic features, but merely by their statements' being subject to acknowl-
edged conditions of acceptance and their possessing the appropriate surface syn-
tactic features."(Wright (1992), p. 74) 
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ist question could be, that is, to specify the deeper feature that a dis-
course must possess to meet the realist demand. That deeper feature 
is, in any case, the kind of feature that, according to Horgan and 
Timmons, descriptive content is supposed to apprehend, namely, the 
sort of feature that alludes to the capacity of a discourse to represent 
the way the world is. 
1.2. On the basis of the distinction between cognitive and descriptive 
content, Horgan and Timmons claim to be in a position to pick up the 
kind of content that is proper to moral judgement. Thus, they intro-
duce the notion of 'a base-case belief' as a basic psychological state 
that involves a commitment which can adopt one of the two follow-
ing forms, namely: an is- or an ought-commitment. If Carme be-
lieves that she is studying hard, she has a certain kind of base-case 
belief, namely, she has an is-commitment with regard to the content 
'that I am studying hard'. We may then say that a belief of this kind is 
a descriptive belief. By contrast, if Carme believes that she ought to 
be studying hard, she has a different sort of base-case belief, i.e., she 
has an ought-commitment with regard to the content 'that I am 
studying hard'. In this case, we may say that Carme has an evaluative 
belief. It seems clear, in any case, that a descriptive and an evaluative 
belief may have some content in common, say, a core descriptive 
content: 
A base-case belief is a kind of psychological commitment state, of 
which there are two main species: is-commitments and ought-commit-
ments. 
Beliefs of both sort have what we call core descriptive content- a way-
the-world-might -be-content. 4 
It is easy to see, however, that core descriptive contents are not, de-
spite appearances to the contrary, descriptive. For descriptive con-
tents have essentially to do with a representation of "the world as be-
ing in a certain way" and thereby they already have a certain direc-
tion of fit; while core descriptive contents are merely concerned 
with 'a way-the-world-might-be-content' because they are meant to 
be neutral with regard to the direction of fit. Hence, it seems at least 
inappropriate to claim, as Horgan and Timmons do, that, with regard 
4. Horgan and Timmons (2000), p. 6. 
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to descriptive beliefs, "the belief's declarative content coincides 
with its core descriptive content."5 They may try to avoid this prob-
lem by offering an alternative characterisation of descriptive beliefs. 
In fact, the quotation above forms a part of a longer sentence that 
says: 
An ordinary descriptive belief ... is an is-commitment with respect to a 
core descriptive content, and so the belief's declarative content coin-
cides with its core descriptive content ... (6) 
Hence, Horgan and Timmons might just drop the last claim, and 
confine themselves to assert that "an ordinary descriptive belief ... is 
an is-commitment with respect to a core descriptive content". The 
declarative content of such beliefs could thereby be identified as the 
combination of two elements: an is-commitment and a core descrip-
tive content.6 While evaluative beliefs will come up as beliefs that 
combine a core descriptive content with an ought-commitment. 
Moral beliefs are, in any case, regarded as beliefs of the evaluative 
kind: 
Whereas descriptive beliefs involve an is-commitment (a how-it-is-
with-the-world commitment) with regard to a core descriptive content, 
moral beliefs involve a different type of commitment: a how-it-ought-
to-be-with-the-world commitment with regard to a core descriptive 
content.7 
1.3. Two of the proclaimed virtues of the new framework are: (a) that 
it does not beg the question against descriptivism, and (b) offers the 
descriptivist a conceptual apparatus to overcome one of her most se-
rious shortcomings, namely: her difficulties to account for the moti-
vational force of moral judgements. I will argue, however, that none 
5. Horgan and Timmons (2000), p. 6. It seems clear that the word 'descrip-
tive' is employed in two senses. In one of them, Horgan and Timmons would 
claim that moral judgements have no descriptive content, while on the other (i.e., 
the one that figures in the phrase 'core descriptive content') moral judgements 
would certainly be identified as having descriptive content. 
6. This way we could consistently maintain the neutrality of core descriptive 
contents with regard to the two sorts of commitments that can be taken towards 
such contents. 
7. Horgan and Timmons (2000), p. 6. 
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of these virtues can really be retained. For, if I am right, the de-
scriptivist stance cannot even be stated within the new framework 
and, even if after some tinkering it could be finally accommodated, I 
see no reason to think that the proposed framework would really 
help the descriptivist to explain moral motivation. 
According to Horgan and Timmons, descriptivism should be 
characterised within the new framework as follows: 
The descriptivist ... could grant what we have said about ought-com-
mitments and is-commitments being distinct commitment types, ... 
without having to deny that morality-involving beliefs and assertions 
have overall descriptive contents (the fundamental claim of the 
descriptivist). Our framework, recall, leaves open whether or not the 
overall declarative content of a moral belief is descriptive. 8 
It is the last claim that I doubt. I do not think there is any relevant 
sense in which the new framework leaves open the possibility that 
the overall declarative content of a moral belief could be descriptive. 
Recall, at this stage, that moral beliefs are uncontroversially eva-
luative. The issue then is not simply whether moral beliefs can be de-
scriptive, but rather whether moral beliefs, despite being evalua-
tive, can also be descriptive. And it is exactly to this question that the 
descriptivist say yes and the nondescriptivist say no. The problem is 
that the new framework appears to rule out the kind of possibility 
that attracts the descriptivist. For it characterises evaluative and de-
scriptive beliefs in exclusive terms. Descriptive beliefs constitu-
tively have a feature that evaluative ones essentially lack: 
By contrast, an evaluative belief is an ought-commitment with respect 
to a core descriptive content. Evaluative beliefs differ essentially from 
descriptive beliefs in the following respect: the core descriptive content 
of an evaluative belief does not coincide with its overall declarative 
content.9 
Hence, and contrary to what Horgan and Timmons urge, it seems 
that there is no relevant sense in which the descriptivist could consis-
tently claim that "morality-involving beliefs and assertions have 
overall descriptive contents (the fundamental claim of the de-
8. Horgan and Timmons (2000), p. 10. 
9. Horgan and Timmons (2000), p. 6, stress is mine. 
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scriptivist)". In the light of this, it is hard to see how the descriptivist 
stance could even be stated within Horgan and Timmons' new 
framework. There are, however, some other resources to which they 
may appeal in order to expound the descriptivist view. 
They provide such further resources as they seek to explain how 
the new framework allows the descriptivist to accommodate our in-
tuitions about the motivational relevance of moral judgements: 
Adopting the framework, descriptivists would maintain that the belief, 
e.g., Bertie ought to mail the parcel is both an is-commitment with re-
spect to the overall declarative content (which they understand to be de-
scriptive), that it ought to be that Bertie mails the parcel, and an 
ought-commitment with respect to the core descriptive content, that 
Bertie mails the parcel. Given the specific functional role and phenom-
enology distinctive of ought-commitments, descriptivists could 
thereby neatly combine their view with internalism ... So descriptivists 
have no reason to suppose that our framework begs any important 
metaethical questions against them, and they have good reason to posi-
tively embrace it. 10 
We should then say that, according to the descriptivist, Canne's be-
lief 'I ought to be studying hard' involves two commitments. A triv-
ial ought-commitment with 'that I am studying hard' as its core de-
scriptive content, and an is-commitment with regard to a rather pe-
culiar kind of core descriptive content, namely: 'that it ought to be 
that I am studying hard'. We thus seem to obtain a way in which the 
descriptivist stance could be finally expressed within the new frame-
work. But is this new presentation really intelligible? 
The first worry is whether 'that it ought to be that I am studying 
hard' could really count as a core descriptive content. Core descrip-
tive contents have been identified as 'a way-the-world-might-be' 
and, consequently, as essentially open to any direction of fit. Hence, 
if we should include an ought-commitment within a core descriptive 
content, I do not really see how that neutrality could at all be pre-
served. A second, related concern is that I do not think Horgan and 
Timmons have provided any sense in which, as their characterisa-
tion of the descriptivist view require, an ought-commitment could 
be nested into an is-commitment. For, in principle, these two sorts of 
10. Horgan and Timmons (2000), p. 10-11, stress is mine. 
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commitments have been individuated as having two opposite direc-
tions of fit. 
Let us, in any event, suppose that these problems could be over-
come and descriptivism could be properly stated within the new 
framework, my next difficulty is that I do not see how such a frame-
work could really help the descriptivist to address the internalist is-
sue, that is, to show how the acceptance of a moral judgement could 
be internally connected with being motivated to act in a certain way. 
Horgan and Timmons suggest that the descriptivist should regard 
Carme's belief 'I ought to be studying hard' as a single belief involv-
ing two sorts of commitment, an is- and an ought-commitment. 
Nothing is said, however, about how these two commitments are 
supposed to be united in a single belief. First of all, as Horgan and 
Timmons identify them, they do not even have their core descriptive 
content in common. The is-commitment has 'that it ought to be that I 
am studying hard' and the ought-commitment has 'that I am study-
ing hard' as their respective core descriptive contents. But, secondly, 
even if the required unification between the two commitments could 
be obtained, the internalist problem for the descriptivist still re-
mains. The difficulty lies precisely in showing how out of an is-com-
mitment as to the content 'I ought to be studying hard' an 
ought-commitment as to 'I am studying hard' should necessarily 
originate. Couldn't Carme just assume the is-commitment without 
the ought-commitment being thereby engendered? I honestly do not 
see how the new framework can help the descriptivist in this respect. 
I guess that those who would perceive the gap between accepting a 
moral judgement and being motivated, would still notice it in 
Horgan and Timmons' restatement of the descriptivist stance. These 
people would then ask: Why does a moral judgement necessarily in-
volve not just an is-commitment but an ought-commitment as well? 
The use of the word 'commitment' should not hide the opposite di-
rection offit that characterises is- and ought-commitments. 11 In fact, 
11. " ... Moral beliefs differ from descriptive beliefs by not being governed 
by a platitude that Jackson, Oppy, and Smith claim holds for beliefs in general 
-viz. that a belief is a state that is designed to fit the facts." (Horgan and Timmons 
(1996b), p. 231) It seems, though, that Horgan and Timmons also concede this 
point insofar as they assert that it is essential to evaluative beliefs that their over-
all declarative content does not coincide with their core descriptive content. 
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the contrast between these two sorts of commitments just represents 
a rather traditional way of expressing the distinct directions of fit 
that serve to identify, within a Humean theory of motivation, beliefs 
as opposed to desires. And, as Michael Smith has brilliantly put for-
ward, 12 the assumption of such a theory is the main source of con-
cern for any attempt to regard moral judgements as both descriptive 
and motivational. This does not mean that such a tension is ulti-
mately insurmountable, I am just urging that Horgan and Timmons 
still owe us an account of how their framework could contribute at 
all to assuage such a strain. 
We can thus conclude that, contrary to what Horgan and 
Timmons claim, their metaethical framework: (a) seems to beg the 
question against the descriptivist because it has trouble stating that 
sort of stance, and (b) it is uncertain whether that framework could 
really help the descriptivist to account for our internalist intuitions. 
1.4. Horgan and Timmons are, in any case, convinced that 
descriptivism is wrong. In fact, they devote a significant portion of 
their reflection on metaethical issues to challenge a few recent real-
ist proposals, namely: 13 (i) Brink's and Boyd's project to show that 
there are moral facts because, after all, moral terms refer to func-
tional properties, and (ii) Michael Smith's metaethical rationalism. 
In both cases, the notion of convergence plays a crucial role. Horgan 
and Timmons assume that the lack of the required kind of conver-
gence casts doubt on the objectivity of moral facts. This is why they 
try to motivate the following claim: with regard to moral judge-
ments, rational agents cannot achieve the kind of convergence that is 
associated with descriptive discourse. 
In this paper, I will specifically intervene in Horgan and Tim-
mons' debate about moral realism by examining their case against 
Michael Smith's metaethical rationalism. Although I sympathise 
with Horgan and Timmons' main claims in this respect, I am less en-
12. Cf. Smith (1994), ch. 1 
13. "First is what Jackson (1998) calls the location problem in ethics- the 
problem of locating putative moral facts and properties in the natural world ... 
Here, we refer our readers to some of our past writings in which we show (so we 
think), that various realist attempts to solve the problem inevitably fail, and are 
destined to keep on failing" (Horgan and Timmons (2000), p. 11). 
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thusiastic about the arguments that they provide to support them. 
That is why I will divide the discussion into two basic steps: ( 1) I will 
present Smith's argument for the contention that normative reasons 
require the convergence "in the desires of fully rational agents", (2) I 
will reconstruct and challenge Horgan and Timmons' stance with re-
gard to this contention. 
2. A challenge to Michael Smith's Metaethical Rationalism 
1.2. Michael Smith argues that reasons are not agent-relative, that 
having a reason for an action cannot be relative to a given agent. 14 Of 
course, a particular agent A may have some features (say, talents, 
preferences, attachments, and so on, that other agents lack) which 
are relevant to the fact that she has, in the circumstances, a reason R 
to cr. But this does not pick up a relevant sense in which that reason is 
agent-relative, since it forms a part, as Smith urges, of the concept of 
rationality that any agent with the same relevant features would 
have, in the same circumstances, a reason R to cr. In general, we can 
say that every agent whose circumstances (including talents, attach-
ments and so on) would coincide with those of agent A, would also 
have a reason R to cr. This is why Smith sustains: 
... it is desirable that p in C just in case we would all desire that p in C if 
we were fully rational. 15 
But this amounts to claiming, according to Smith, that all fully ratio-
nal agents would desire that p in C and, consequently, that all fully 
rational agents must converge on their judgements about what is de-
sirable in C. And this is possible, as we have seen, because the 
agent's preferences are represented as part of the circumstances that 
a fully rational agent should take into account in her deliberation. 16 
14. Cf. Smith (1994), ch. 5. 
15. Smith (1994), p.I67. 
16. " ... Even if an agent's preferences may enter into a specification of the 
circumstances that she faces it may still be the case that whether or not she is ra-
tionally justified in taking her own preferences into account, and the way in 
which she is justified in taking them into account if she is, depends on whether 
fully rational agents would all converge on a desire which makes the preferences 
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This does not entail that all fully rational agents should act the same 
way because, obviously, the circumstances in which each of these 
agents might be placed will certainly vary. 17 
Once one accepts that, if there are normative reasons, then the de-
sires of fully rational agents must converge, 18 Smith still needs to 
specify the means by which such a convergence should take place, 
that is, some procedures must still be mentioned to determine what a 
fully rational agent has a reason to do in circumstances C. Smith re-
sorts, at this point, to the idea of reflective equilibrium. He assumes 
that a rational agent should try to increase the degree of unity and co-
herence among her beliefs and desires. 19 This search will eventually 
lead to the acquisition of new beliefs and desires, as well as to the 
abandonment of others. A rational agent would thus adopt the set of 
beliefs and desires that, after a process of reflection, possesses the 
highest degree of unity and coherence. 20 
Horgan and Timmons object that this procedure by itself does not 
ensure that the process will conduce to the kind of convergence 
among fully rational agents that Smith calls for. In fact, the experi-
ence of moral disagreement is so pervasive that we could hardly ex-
pect that such a convergence would at all take place. To motivate this 
claim, Horgan and Timmons ask us to indulge into a thought experi-
she has relevant to her choice and, if they do, the way in which the desire they 
converge upon makes her preferences relevant to her choice." (Smith (1994), p. 
171). 
17. "In their own worlds fully rational agents will find themselves in quite 
different circumstances from each other, circumstances that are conditioned by 
their different embodiments, talents, environments and attachments in their re-
spective worlds. Their desires about how to organize their own lives in their own 
worlds will therefore reflect these differences in the circumstances. The conver-
gence required is rather at the level of their hypothetical desires about what is to 
be done in the various circumstances in which they !night find themselves (Smith 
(1994), p. 173). 
18. "In defending the non-relative conception of normative reasons we have 
therefore said nothing to suggest that, substantively, there are any such reasons." 
(Sinith (1994), p. 173) 
19. These are just two values among many others. 
20. Strictly speaking Sinith (1994, p. 159)'s use of the idea of reflective equi-
librium is only concerned with beliefs (including beliefs about one's own de-
sires) as a part of his anti-Humean theory of normative reasons. 
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ment involving the differences between Earth and Moral Twin 
Earth, and conclude that moral differences between earthlings and 
twin-earthlings are rationally irreducible. This thought-experiment 
is quite recurrent in Horgan and Timmons' challenge to moral real-
ism, although the argument that they run rests on a number of sub-
stantial assumptions. Such assumptions are, indeed, shared by the 
realists to which their objections are raised in each case, but make it 
difficult to use a thought-experiment as prima facie evidence for the 
lack of the required convergence in the case of moral discourse. 
There is, however, a second line of reasoning which invites the same 
thought, although in a rather less theoretically committed way. 
Horgan and Timmons appeal, in this respect, to the controversy 
between Hilary Putnam and Robert Nozick about the moral ade-
quacy of government spending on welfare. One of the interesting 
features of this case is that the disagreement remains after a long, de-
tailed, and honest process of discussion; that the failure to converge 
cannot, at first sight, be imputed to some cognitive shortcoming in 
the process of reflection. It looks as if the situation were ideal to 
reach the required convergence, that if such a convergence cannot be 
obtained in this case, then there is no reason to think that it could ever 
be achieved. In other words, we cannot expect that the disagreement 
between Putnam and Nozick could be finally overcome thanks to a 
further step in the process of reflective equilibrium. For their diver-
gence is not to be explained by a deficiency in this process, but by 
their disparate moral sensitivities. So, it seems that reflective equi-
librium may lead to different peaks depending on the moral sensitiv-
ity that guides the reflection. 21 
It is uncertain whether this sort of consideration may really touch 
Smith's stance. After all, he does not hold that all fully rational 
agents would converge in their actual desires but only in their hypo-
thetical ones. The set of desires that a fully rational agent actually 
has, will surely depend on the circumstances were she is actually 
21. " ... When one reflects on this sort of case [Putnam vs. Nozick], involving 
a very high level of sophistication and moral sensibility, it just looks ve1y un-
likely that any movement in the direction of yet greater unity and coherence will 
bring the two together on this issue ... It seems much more plausible to attribute 
their differences to significantly different moral sensibilities" (Horgan and 
Timmons (1996a), p. 212). 
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placed. Whereas her hypothetical desires concern the desires that 
she would have if she were placed in such and such circumstances. 
Trivially, fully rational agents could only converge on their hypo-
thetical desires. And this is really plausible if, as Smith does, we as-
sume that the agent's attachments, preferences, and so on, do not be-
long to her identity as a rational agent, but instead to the circum-
stances that the rational agent must contemplate in her practical de-
liberation. This is why the agent's actual desires are irrelevant to the 
kind of convergence that Smith calls for and that should be reached 
through a process of reflective equilibrium.22 
Smith could argue, as a result, that, even if Putnam and Nozick ac-
tual desires differ with regard to certain issues, this does not imply 
that their hypothetical desires would diverge too. Their moral dis-
agreement could be explained by the disparity in the constellation of 
moral values that they endorse. And, consequently, Smith could sug-
gest that the fact that an agent subscribes to a particular set of moral 
values does not really form a part of her identity as a fully rational 
agent, that this fact, like all her attachments and preferences, should 
instead be aééêoúachÉd=as part of the circumstances upon which a ra-
tional agent should deliberate. And, in this sense, it is clear that 
Putnam and Nozick despite their confrontation may still coincide on 
their hypothetical desires. Putnam could acknowledge that, if he had 
had Nozick's moral sensitivity, he would have rejected welfare poli-
cies, and Nozick would certainly concede the reciprocal claim. 
It is important to see that this line of reasoning holds no matter 
whether an agent's moral values are or not ultimately reducible to 
her nonmoral attachments and preferences. If they were reducible, 
then they should be straightforwardly treated, according to Smith, as 
part of the circumstances upon which the rational agent must delib-
erate. And if they were not, shouldn't the agent's attachments and 
preferences quite reasonably be treated as thick experiences where 
22. "Which desires I would end up with, after engaging in such process [a 
process of systematic justification], thus in no way depends on what my actual 
desires are to begin with. Reason itself determines the content of our fully ratio-
nal desires, not the arbitrary fact that we have the actual desires that we have. Re-
flection on the concept of desirability thus leaves the normative significance of 
facts about what is desirable and undesirable perfectly intact." (Smith (1994), p. 
173). 
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moral and nonmoral values coalesce? But, in that case, the agent's 
moral values would be at least partly embodied in her attachments 
and preferences and, thereby, would form a part of the circum-
stances upon which rational agents deliberate. 
2.3. Be that as it may, Horgan and Timmons allow for an interpreta-
tion of the term 'rational' such that Smith's fundamental claim co-
mes up as a conceptual truth, namely: 
(T 1) normative reasons require the convergence in the desires of 
fully rational agents, 
But, indeed, they take it that their remarks about Putnam vs. Nozick 
controversy support: 
(T2) Moral disagreements cannot always be solved rationally. 
And, indeed, the combination of (Tl) and (T2) seem to imply that 
there cannot be normative reasons in the moral domain. Yet, Horgan 
and Timmons try to block this transition by distinguishing between a 
thin and a thick notion of rationality. Thin rationality is supposed to 
be morally neutral, while, on the thick view, rationality constitu-
tively involves the endorsement of some moral values. Conse-
quently, what Horgan and Timmons' considerations would show is 
simply that there is no way in which thin rationality could settle 
moral disagreements. In other words, they take it that (T2) holds in-
sofar as 'rationally' in that statement is thinly interpreted. On the 
contrary, they claim that (T2) is false on a thick interpretation of that 
term: 
If one interprets the platitudinous connection [i.e., (Tl)] in questioning 
terms of a thick notion of rationality, then ... we can allow that norma-
tive-reasons claims, of the sort implicated by moral judgements, are 
tied to being fully rational and presuppose that all fully rational agents 
would converge. Of course, in rejecting the thin notion of rationality, 
we construe judgements about normative reasons as morally charged.23 
23. Horgan and Timmons (1996a), p. 221-2. 
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As a result, Horgan and Timmons suggest that, since rational assess-
ments are morally loaded, Putnam could judge " ... that Nozick's 
moral outlook is not fully rational because part of being fully ratio-
nal is having a suitable moral sensitivity, which is something Nozick 
simply lacks."24 1t would trivially follow that Nozick's convergence 
on Putnam's view is not something that (Tl) would ask for because 
Nozick is not, after all, a fully rational agent. 
This sounds quite unsatisfactory, however, because Nozick could 
certainly make a claim parallel to the one ascribed to Putnam, he 
could legitimately say that Putnam's moral outlook is not fully ratio-
nal because the latter does not have the suitable moral sensitivity. 
This possibility is, in fact, contemplated by Putnam as he points out, 
in a long text quoted by Horgan and Timmons, that "each of us re-
gards the other as lacking, at this level, a certain kind of sensitivity 
and perception."25 
To put it another way, it seems clear that we can buy convergence 
in moral judgements by buying divergence in the identification of 
'fully rational agents'. But I think (Tl) could only retain some con-
tent if a certain convergence in the determination of fully rational 
agents is taken for granted. And, as we have seen, the thick notion of 
rationality could only render (Tl) true on the basis of a shifting iden-
tification of the set of rational agents. 
This is not to deny that, as Putnam emphasises, moral judgements 
are not a matter of taste, that a sort of contempt for the divergent 
moral view is constitutive of taking a moral stance. I could even ac-
cept that such a contempt could eventually be expressed as a lack of 
rationality on the other's side: " ... One really does feel that one view 
is reasonable and the other irrational."26 The deep problem is how to 
compatibilize these contentions with the fact that Nozick would 
have exactly the same sort of contempt and could legitimately de-
nounce Putnam's irrationality. And, insofar as this tension is notre-
leased, there is no way in which we can contentfully allow for (Tl). 
But this is not my only worry with Horgan and Timmons' strategy to 
deny (T2) on the basis of a thick understanding of rationality. There 
24. Horgan and Timmons (1996a), 220-2. 
25. Putnam (1981), p. 165. 
26. Putnam (1981), p. 166. 
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is, at least, a further concern. 
I think it can be shown that, even if thick rationality involves 
some moral values, it does not follow that all difference in moral 
sensitivity are differences in rationality. In fact, this is a point that 
Horgan and Timmons seem to concede as they approvingly charac-
terise Putnam's view: 
It is worth noting that the morally thick usage of terms like 'reasonable' 
and 'irrational' that Putnam is here highlighting is not necessarily so 
thoroughly tethered to one's own moral sensibility that one would clas-
sify as irrational (under this usage) anyone whose moral sensibility and 
considered moral judgments diverge from one's own. The terminology 
can instead be used in a way that (i) is morally loaded, yet (ii) recog-
nizes certain alternative moral perspectives as falling within the 
bounds of rationality, but (iii) classifies as irrational certain moral per-
spectives that differ in significant enough ways from one's own.27 
A consequence of this is that, on some occasions, two agents could 
diverge in their moral judgements because they have different moral 
sensitivities and, nevertheless, be both fully rational. For their re-
spective moral sensitivities are not far enough to discard each other 
as irrational, but they are not close enough to ensure that they coin-
cide in their moral judgements about any particular situation. 
2.4. It seems, then, that the notion of thick rationality does not permit 
us to exclude (T2). And this sounds like a serious problem for 
Horgan and Timmons because they want to have normative reasons 
and, nevertheless, are reluctant to jettison (Tl) because they regard it 
as a platitudinous contention about normative reasons. What to do 
then? In Corbf (2000), I propose to challenge (Tl). In that paper, I ar-
gue, firstly, that Smith's argument for (Tl) is a non-sequitur and, 
secondly, that (Tl) is internally inconsistent because it rests on an 
unintelligible notion of 'fully rational agent'. But if (Tl) is not a nec-
essary condition for normative reasons, this may certainly be wel-
come by Horgan and Timmons. For this outcome suggests an inter-
pretation of moral discourse that may retain its normativity and, nev-
ertheless, do not ask for the kind of convergence that (Tl) vindicates 
and that sounds specific of a descriptive discourse. We could thus 
27. Horgan and Timmons (1996a), fn. 23. 
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have both cognitivism and nondescriptivism. I suspect, however, 
that this transition to nondescriptivism rests on an implausible con-
vergence demand. For, ifl am right, that demand cannot even be sat-
isfied by those kind of discourses that are paradigmatically pre-
sented as descriptive, like, for instance, the discourse about the 
shape of objects. 
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